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FOREWORD 
The challenge the CGIAR has 
been facing in 1993 and 1994 was the 
contrast between an extended man- 
date and stagnating or decreasing fi- 
nancial support from its donors. In this 
situation the need for a vision that is 
shared by its stakeholders and broadly 
understood was evident. Such a vision 
should be accessible to policymakers 
and scientists alike. It also should guide 
the adjustment process in the CGL4R. 
At its regular meeting in Washington, 
D.C. in October 1993, the Group, 
therefore, decided to commission an 
expert panel to prepare a future vi- 
sion of international agricultural re- 
search with a view to making a con- 
vincing case for increased support to 
the CGIAR. 
What was needed was a vision 
that was imaginative, forward-looking 
and reflective, covering the next 20 to 
30 years. To ascertain that it be fresh 
and unencumbered by internal CGIAR 
interests, it was felt that it should be 
written by scientists without close per- 
sonal affiliation to the CGIAR. 
Recruitment of the expert panel 
and organization of its work was done 
by the CGIAR Oversight Committee. 
Professor Gordon Conway, Vice-Chan- 
cellor of the University of Sussex, UK, 
chaired the panel. Other panel mem- 
bers were Dr. Uma Lele, University of 
Florida, USA; Dr. W. James Peacock, 
Commonwealth Scientific and Indus- 
trial Research Organization, Canberra, 
Australia; and Dr. Martin Piiieiro, an 
independent consultant living in 
Buenos Aires, Argentina. Dr. Peter 
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Hazel1 of IFPRI, Washington D.C.: USA 
and Mr. lzlichel Griffon! CIRAD, Paris, 
France assisted the panel as resource 
persons, and Dr. Selcuk ijzgediz of the 
CGIAR Secretariat as working secretary. 
Henri Carsalade and Johan Holrnberg 
from the CGIAR Oversight Committee 
participated throughout in the work of 
the panel. 
The panel held two workshops. 
Panel members interacted with TAC 
and with the Oversight Committee. A 
final draft was compiled and presented 
by Professor Conway to the meeting 
of the CGIAR in New Delhi in late May 
1994. Final editing of the draft was done 
first by Professor Conway and later, in 
July, by Henri Carsalade and Johan 
Holmberg to reflect the discussion in 
New Delhi as well as other comments 
on the draft. 
Preparation of this report was, 
thus, very much a collective effort, and 
my sincere appreciation goes to all the 
individuals mentioned above who par- 
ticipated in the exercise. However, Pro- 
fessor Conway’s untiring efforts were 
instrumental in bringing the process to 
a successful conclusion under a very 
tight time schedule. It is, thus, first and 
foremost to him that the CGIAR owes 
much gratitude for this report. 
Vision, adjustments in governance 
and financing, and the interphase with 
national programs are key components 
for a reinvigorated CGIAR. This vision 
statement is a contribution to this goal. 
SARFC’s support in financially support- 
ing the work of the panel and in pub- 
lishing this report is gratefully acknowl- 
edged. 
Paul A. Egger 
Chairman 
CGIAR Oversight Committee 
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THE CHALLENGE 
B y the year 2025r there will be about 8.5 billion people on the 
planet, of whom some 7 billion will 
be living in the developing countries 
of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.2 
The questions we have to ask our- 
selves now are: 
. Can we: 
- produce enough food to 
feed this population; 
- in a sustainable manner, 
without damaging the en- 
vironment; and 
- ensure the food is acces- 
sible to all, so that every 
one receives at least an ad- 
equate diet? 
. Should we, and can we: 
- enable developing coun- 
tries to meet most of their 
own food needs; and 
- ensure that agricultural 
production is more effec- 
tively linked with eco- 
nomic and social develop- 
ment? 
’ We have chosen the year 2025 as our future 
reference point for a number of reasons: we 
know with reasonable accuracy the size of 
the world population and the amount of food 
they will need; 2025 lies within the lifetime 
of most of the people on this planet alive 
today; and, 2025 lies within the lifetime of 
many, if not most, of those who currently 
make or influence national and global poli- 
cies. 
’ In the document we distinguish between “in 
dustrial countries” and “developing coun- 
tries.” The latter encompass a great variety 
of countries from those with GNP per capita 
exceeding US$2,000 in the newly industrial- 
ized countries to the poorest countries in 
the world with GNP per capita below 
US$250. The economies of all these devel- 
oping countries can be expected to change, 
some markedly, by the year 2025, but for 
ease of comparison we assume that coun- 
tries remain in the same categories (of the 
technical annex by Peter Hazel], IFPRI). [See 
Appendix II, page 72.1 
In addressing these issues, we 
need to consider the role of agricul- 
tural research: 
. private and public; 
. international and national; and 
. collaborative. 
In this document we attempt to 
provide answers to these questions, as 
far as we are able, and to outline an 
agenda for action, focusing primarily 
on the role of the CGIAR and its cen- 
ters. 
Our conclusions are that the 
world population in 2025 can be ad- 
equately fed, malnourishment can be 
eliminated, and this can be achieved 
in a way that prevents environmen- 
tal degradation and conserves natu- 
ral resources. We believe, however, 
that this can only be accomplished if 
there is significant investment in pub- 
lic research, both national and inter- 
national, involving the CGIAR System 
in partnership with NARS, on a com- 
monly agreed set of programs. 
Who Are the Hungry? 
Globally we produce enough food 
for everyone to be adequately fed, yet 
hunger is common. More than 700 mil- 
lion people in the developing world 
do not have access to enough food to 
live healthy and productive lives; they 
often go hungry not knowing when 
they will have their next meal. More 
than 180 million children are under- 
weight. Vitamin A deficiencies are wide- 
spread and growing. IMalnourishment 
is contributing to at least one-third of 
child deaths. 
Most of the poor and malnour- 
ished live in rural areas. They tend to 
be landless or are unable, on the land 
available to them, to create a food-se- 
Globally we 
produce enough 
food for everyone 
to be adequately 
fed, yet hunger is 
common. More 
than 700 million 
people in the 
developing world 
do not have access 
to enough food to 
live healthy and 
productive lives; 
they often go 
hungry not knowing 
when they will have 
their next meal. 
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More than half of 
the developing 
world’s poor are in 
South Asia and 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa, and the 
numbers are 
growing at an 
alarming rate. 
cure livelihood.3 They are commonly 
women and children, often in female- 
headed households. The poor also live 
in urban areas, and their numbers are 
growing rapidly. 
Paradoxically, hunger is common 
despite a period of rapidly declining 
world food prices. Low food prices 
should be beneficial to the hungry, 
since they mostly depend on the mar- 
ket for food. However; they lack suffi- 
cient income to purchase enough food 
for their needs. In 1990, more than 1 
billion people were living on less than 
USSl a day in developing countries. 
What Are Their Prospects? 
If nothing is done: the numbers 
of poor and hungry will rise rapidly. 
While global population growth rates 
have declined from a high of 2.1 per- 
cent a year during 1965 to 1973 to 1.6 
percent in the 1990s the size of the 
current annual increment is unprec- 
edented. Until well into the next cen- 
tury, approximately 100 million people 
will be added to the world population 
each year. By the year 2025 the popu- 
lation of the globe will be about 8.5 
billion, of whom 7 billion will be in 
developing countries. [See Figure 1, page 
65.1 
Over half of this population will 
live in urban areas. They and the rural 
population will have to depend on a 
declining area of cropland per person 
and declining access to forests, range- 
j A ‘.livelihood:’ is a means of living, and the 
capabilities, assets. and activities required for 
it. A “food secure livelihood” provides ac- 
cess at all times to the food required by a 
household for a healthy and productive life 
by all of its members. Households may grow- 
sufficient food or may purchase the food they 
require by earning income through selling 
agricultural products or engaging in agricul- 
tural or non-agricultural employment. 
lands, fisheries, and other natural re- 
sources. In Asia, the currently 0.15 hect- 
ares of cropland available per capita 
will fall to a mere 0.09 hectares in 2025. 
Africa will apparently fare better; but, 
the quality of the land is generally 
poorer than in Asia, with less potential 
for irrigation. 
More than half of the developing 
world’s poor are in South Asia and Sub- 
Saharan Africa. and the numbers are 
growing at an alarming rate. The popu- 
lation of South Asia will have grown to 
about 2 billion, but the highest growth 
rates are in Sub-Saharan Africa. From 
the current 500 million, the African 
population will grow to 1.2 billion. 
Population growth in Africa will out- 
strip growth in food production for a 
long time to come unless much more 
is done to accelerate agricultural 
growth. If current trends continue, by 
the year 2025 Africa could well have 
an annual food gap of 214 million tons’ 
(this compares with current imports of 
11 million tons). 
It will take a long time before Af- 
rican countries can generate sufficient 
foreign exchange to purchase such 
large amounts of food. The real prices 
of Africa’s traditional export crops are 
low and declining, and the non-agri- 
culture sector is small. It is also unlikely 
that African governments will be able 
to count on enough food aid to make 
up the difference. All indicators con- 
cur that poverty, malnutrition, and hun- 
ger will increase rapidly in the coming 
years unless action is taken to dramati- 
cally increase agricultural production 
4 In this document we define the ‘,food gap” 
as the cereal-equivalent requirement to meet 
the energy “need” of the population less the 
sum of domestic consumption and imports. 
The “need” assumes a minimum of 3,000 
cereal calories per person per day to cover 
food, livestock feed, seed, storage losses, and 
processing waste. [See Appendix II, page 72.1 
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through technological change that 
also increases agricultural employ- 
ment. 
While not as badly off as Sub- 
Saharan Africa, there are disquieting 
trends in South Asia. Yields are in- 
creasing at a slower rate than they did 
in the past three decades. Growth in 
Asian rice yields, for instance, has 
slowed from an annual rate of 3 per- 
cent in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
to less than 2 percent during the late 
1980s. Total market demand for cere- 
als is likely to increase to an annual 
400 million tons by 2025, with an ad- 
ditional 210 million tons required to 
eradicate hunger. Total cereal produc- 
tion is only likely to increase to 355 
million tons by 2025, and even less if 
yield growth rates continue to slow. The 
potential cereal need gap could: there- 
fore: reach 25 j million tons by 2025. 
Although exports of manufac- 
tured goods are likely to rise more 
rapidly in South Asia than in Sub-Sa- 
haran Africa, it still will not have suf- 
ficient foreign exchange earnings to 
purchase the needed volume of cere- 
als, even if it was available on the 
market. 
Why Should We Be Concerned? 
Over 2 billion people in the 
world regularly watch television. For 
the rich, the images on their screens 
provide a constant reminder of the 
horrors of natural disasters, civil -war! 
and famine. For the poor, the screens 
portray the everyday luxuries of the 
affluent and well-fed. Globally, the 
consequence is a potentially explo- 
sive mix of fears, threats, and unsatis- 
fied hopes. 
The end of the Cold War has not 
brought about an increase in political 
stability. While conflict between East 
and West has declined, there is a fast 
growing divide between the world of 
the peoples, countries, and regions that 
“belong,” in global power terms, and 
those that are excluded. Confronting 
the increasing globalization of govern- 
ment, capital, technology, and trade are 
the surging expectations of the poor. 
Yet this growing conflict receives 
relatively little attention in industrial 
countries. The severe economic reces- 
sion and the end of the Cold War have 
made political agendas inward-looking. 
Governments struggling with record- 
high unemployment, rising costs for 
welfare payments, growing budget defi- 
cits, and political polarization are pay- 
ing little attention to the needs of poor 
nations overseas. The volume of aid 
going to developing countries is stag- 
nating in real terms. The attention the 
industrial world is giving to external 
problems is being focused increasingly 
on the former Eastern Bloc countries. 
Reductions in aid may be justifi- 
able in the short-term, but, we would 
argue, are not in the long-, and even 
the medium-, term interest of indus- 
trial countries. An increasingly polar- 
ized world will result in growing po- 
litical unrest. Already the consequences 
of economic stagnation, population 
growth: environmental degradation, 
and civil war are producing unprec- 
edented movements of peoples. There 
are currently some 14 million refugees 
in need of assistance living in foreign 
countries and at least double that num- 
ber who are refugees or displaced per- 
sons within their own countries. Un- 
less developing countries are helped 
to realize sufficient food, employment, 
and shelter for their growing popula- 
tions, or to gain the means to purchase 
food internationally, the political sta- 
All indicators 
concur that poverfy, 
malnutrition, and 
hunger will increase 
rapidly in the 
coming years 
unless action is 
taken to 
drama tically 
increase 
agricultural 
production through 
technological 
change that also 
increases 
agricultural 
employment. 
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Justice and equity 
also demand that 
poverty be 
eliminated, 
Moreover, it is a 
goal within our 
capacity 
Globalization, while 
threatening on the 
one hand to 
concentrate power 
and increase 
division, on the 
other contains the 
economic and 
technological 
potential to 
transform the lives 
of the rich and poor 
alike. 
bility of the world will be further un- 
dermined with grave consequences for 
us all. 
Justice and equity also demand 
that poverty be eliminated. Moreover, 
it is a goal within our capacity. 
Globalization, while threatening on the 
one hand to concentrate power and 
increase division, on the other contains 
the economic and technological poten- 
tial to transform the lives of rich and 
poor alike. Much depends on where 
our priorities lie and, in particular, 
whether there is sufficient access by 
the poor to the economic opportuni- 
ties created by the products of new 
technologies. Here, as we will argue, 
international agricultural research has 
a particularly crucial role to play. 
FOOD PRODUCTION PROSPECTS 
What Are the Current Trends? 
While a significant proportion of 
the growth in cereal production since 
the 1960s has come from the expan- 
sion of arable land, yields of major ce- 
reals have more than doubled in the 
past three decades. On past trends we 
ought to be able to continue to match 
the rising population with a compa- 
rable increase in food production on 
existing arable land, at least to the year 
2025. 
There are, in theory, no major 
physiological, genetic, or agronomic 
constraints to achieving the necessary 
yield gains. Conventional plant breed- 
ing techniques, increasingly augmented 
by genetic engineering, should be able 
to produce improved plant types ca- 
pable of significantly higher yields in 
all parts of the world. There is consid- 
erable potential for increased and more 
efficient fertilizer use. Although appli- 
The Challenge of Globalization 
Traditional patterns of gover- 
nance are being eroded. The su- 
premacy of notional governments is 
being challenged from within by eth- 
nic and religious groupings and from 
outside by supranational institutions, 
such as the International &Coneta7y 
Fund, the World Bank, GAT and the 
European Union. At the same time, 
NGOs are beginning to operateglobally, 
pressing for citizens’ rights, more de- 
velopment aid, and the elimination of 
poverty. 
Capital is increasingly invested 
on a global scale. Multinational cor- 
porations aregrowing inpoweras capi- 
tal becomes more mobile aladfinancial 
markets are deregulated. In mazyparts 
of the world this opens up new eco- 
nomic opportunities; in others. per- 
ceived aspoorly endowed with human 
andphysical resources, there is little in- 
vestment. While the economies of the 
newly industrialized countries of East 
Asia grow apace, much of Sub-Saharan 
Africa stagnates or is in decline. 
Modern technology and the ac- 
companying research and develop- 
ment are now disseminated through 
global communications and multina- 
tional research networks. Much is in 
the bands of multinational corpora- 
tions, yet many powerful advanced 
technologies are often small in. scale, 
readily transferable and become in- 
creasingly inexperzsive with mass use. 
Trade now operates through a 
great variety of global markets. While 
trading blocks such as the European 
Union continue to prevent easy access 
of goods from developing countries, 
current GATTnegotiations are likely to 
create new opportunitiesfor manufac- 
tured goods and agricultural exports. 
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cation rates are relatively high in those 
regions where the green revolution has 
occurred, the average in Asia is still only 
30 kiIograms of nitrogen per hectare: 
in Latin America it is 15 kilograms and 
in Africa 4 kilograms. This compares 
with national averages of 120 to 550 
kilograms for the industrial countries 
of Western Europe, Japan, and China. 
Equally significant is the poten- 
tial for improving the supply of water 
through irrigation and various means 
of water conservation. Between 1960 
and 1990 the area under irrigation grew 
from 100 to 170 million hectares. It is 
estimated that irrigated land in devel- 
oping countries could be expanded by 
nearly 60 percent, with most of the 
potential in India, China, and other 
countries in Asia. However, in recent 
years there has been a significant de- 
crease in the rate of expansion of irri- 
gation as real costs of irrigation projects 
have risen. 
Are the Trends Sustainable? 
The desire for food security has 
left its mark on the environment, some- 
times permanently. Hunger leads to 
desperate strategies for survival, and 
attempts to meet basic needs often take 
precedence in the short-term over 
longer-term sustainability. The blame 
should not be placed on the poor and 
hungry. Exploitation of resources by the 
rich, unsuitable agricultural technolo- 
gies, and lack of appropriate institu- 
tions and governmental policies have 
combined to damage both well-favored 
and environmentally-fragile lands. 
Globally about 2 billion hectares 
of soil, of which 1. 5 billion lie in de- 
veloping countries (17 percent of all 
vegetated areas>, have become de- 
graded due to human action since 1945. 
Degradation includes water and wind 
erosion! loss of soil nutrients, saliniza- 
tion, acidification, pollution, compac- 
tion, waterlogging, and subsidence. 
Most, but not all, results from inappro- 
priate agricultural practices. Lack of 
terraces, failure to replace nutrients and 
organic matter, and excessive irrigation 
or drainage are damaging arable land. 
Rangeland is being degraded by over- 
grazing. Whether or not agriculture is 
a cause, soil degradation severely lim- 
its agricultural productivity. In some 
cases reclamation is bio-physically im- 
possible. In others, the costs are high, 
but reclamation can be achieved with 
labor, ingenuity, and new technologies. 
Other natural resources which 
also contribute directly or indirectly to 
food security are also being lost at un- 
precedented rates. The annual rate of 
destruction of closed forests is about 
16 million hectares each year. This rep- 
resents a substantial loss of potential 
income and employment from the sus- 
tainable harvest of timber, firewood, 
and other non-timber forest products. 
Forest destruction is also one of the 
prime causes of the increasing loss of 
global biodiversity. An estimated 15 
percent of the world’s plant and ani- 
mal species could become extinct by 
2025, many with potential for agricul- 
tural or forest exploitation. 
Competition for water for agricul- 
ture has increased dramatically during 
the past two decades due to rapidly 
growing domestic and industrial de- 
mands. This situation will worsen 
through much of Africa and the Middle 
East by 2025. Significantly, the earlier 
high rates of expansion of irrigation 
appear to be unsustainable. Their con- 
tinuation could exhaust irrigation po- 
tential in Asia well before 2025, would 
require an investment of US$500-1,000 
billion. and would face formidable 
The desire for food 
security has left its 
mark on the 
environment, 
sometimes 
permanently. 
Hunger leads to 
desperate 
strategies for 
survival, and 
attempts to meet 
basic needs often 
take precedence in 
the shot?-term over 
longer- term 
sustainability. 
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While industry is 
the major source of 
global pollution, 
agriculture is a 
growing contributor, 
producing 
significant levels of 
methane, carbon 
dioxide, and nitrous 
oxide. 
technological environment and social 
constraints. A more feasible approach, 
especially for Sub-Saharan Africa, is 
through small-scale harnessing of wa- 
ter, but this requires appropriate incen- 
tives and institutions, coupled with new 
skills and technologies. More generally: 
greater emphasis will have to be given 
to improved management of irrigation 
systems. 
The global harvest of wild fisher- 
ies is estimated to have peaked at 89 
million tons in 1989. For most wild fish 
stocks the harvest is stagnant or de- 
clining as a result of overexploitation, 
pollution, and the use of fishing prac- 
tices that damage the environment. 
Partial compensation is coming from 
aquaculture, which contributes 12 mil- 
lion tons a year and is growing at 10 
percent, but its sustainability is threat- 
ened by pollution and conflicts over 
the use of coastal ecosystems. 
Increased agricultural production 
is also limited by pollution. Industry is 
often to blame, but agriculture may be 
a both culprit and a victim. In the in- 
tensively farmed lands of both indus- 
trial and developing countries, heavy 
fertilizer applications are producing 
nitrate levels in drinking water that 
approach or exceed permitted levels, 
increasing the likelihood of government 
restrictions on fertilizer use. Pesticides 
are also causing serious harm, particu- 
larly in developing countries. There is 
growing human morbidity and mortal- 
ity while pest populations are becom- 
ing resistant and escaping from natu- 
ral control. 
While industry is the major source 
of global pollution, agriculture is a 
growing contributor, producing signifi- 
cant levels of methane, carbon diox- 
ide, and nitrous oxide. 
Individually, or in combination, 
these gases and their products are con- 
tributing to global warming, the deple- 
tion of stratospheric ozone, acid depo- 
sition, and the build up of ozone levels 
in the lower atmosphere. These will, 
in turn, significantly affect agricultural 
production. Global warming, for ex- 
ample, will have effects that vary with 
latitude. Heat and water stress at low 
latitudes, where most developing coun- 
Global Pollution Caused by 
Agriculture 
Methane. Forty-fivepercent of glo- 
bal emissions are produced by paddy 
fields, the guts of livestock, and the 
burning of vegetation. Methane contrib- 
utes to increased tropospheric ozone. 
to destruction of ozone in the strato- 
sphere, and to global warming. 
Nitrous oxide. About I to 3 mil- 
lion tons of nitrous oxide is produced 
per year from nitrogen fertilizers, live- 
stock waste, and the burning of vegeta- 
tion. Levels are rising at about 0.2 to 
0.3 percent per yea?; mostly driven by 
fertilizer u,se. Nitrous oxide, when con- 
verted to nitric oxide, contributes to the 
depletion of stratospheric ozone and to 
global warming. 
Carbon dioxide. Burning biom- 
ass on Savannah lands, in swidden ag- 
riculture, and aspart of thepermanent 
conversion offorest to agriculture con- 
tm’butes the equivalent of a quarter to a 
third of carbon dioxide produced from. 
burning fossil fuels. Carbon dioxide 
emissions are responsibleforabout haq 
of current and projected global warm- 
ing. 
Ammonia risesfrom nitrogen fer- 
tilizer applications and the volatiliza- 
tion of livestock waste and biomass 
burning. It contributes to acid deposi- 
tion . 
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tries are situated, will result in signifi- 
cant losses in yield. How-ever, in the 
middle and high latitudes, the com- 
bined effect of temperature increases 
and the direct physiological effect of 
higher levels of carbon dioxide is 
likely to result in higher yields. Cur- 
rent projections thus suggest yield in- 
creases in the temperate, industrial 
regions of the world, but significant 
reductions in tropical and subtropical 
developing countries, possibly on the 
order of 30 to 50 percent. 
Are There Signs of Stagnation? 
As a group, developing countries 
increased per capita food production 
by 13 percent during the 1980s but 
some regions performed much better 
than the average and some much 
worse. East Asia is the star performer, 
increasing per capita food production 
by 22 percent during the 1980s. 
China’s increase has been 35 percent. 
However, in Africa and West Asia 
there has been a continuing decline 
in per capita food production. 
In 75 of the w-orld’s countries! 
less food per capita was produced at 
the end of the 1980s than at the be- 
ginning. In 15 countries per capita 
food production fell by 20 percent or 
more. In Asia, as a whole, the annual 
rate of increase in rice and wheat 
yields in the late 1980s was consider- 
ably less than in the 1970s and early 
1980s. [See Figure 2a, page 66.1 In Af- 
rica, yields are still apparently grow- 
ing, but with wide fluctuations. [See 
Figure 2b, page 66.1 
Particularly worrying is the evi- 
dence, as yet not well documented, 
of signs of stagnation in yield growth 
rates in those areas of developing 
countries where the green revolution 
had its greatest impact. In the Indian 
Punjab, for example, yield growth is 
being threatened by worsening avail- 
ability and poor management of water, 
coupled with exhaustion of micronu- 
trients, salinization, and build up of 
pests and diseases. 
On a global scale, grain produc- 
tion per person has shown signs of stag- 
nation if not a slight decline since 1985. 
[See Figure 3, page 67.1 There have also 
been significant declines in non-cereal 
staples. In the 1980s per capita produc- 
tion of roots and tubers in developing 
countries fell by over 7 percent. There 
was a similar decline in production of 
plantains, and per capita banana pro- 
duction barely increased. 
While per capita production of 
meat, milk, and other livestock prod- 
ucts is continuing to increase in devel- 
oping countries, per capita fish produc- 
tion is set to decline over the next 30 
years unless aquaculture begins to grow 
at a much faster rate. 
What is Forecast? 
Total cereal market demand in 
developing countries for food and feed 
is projected to double to 2 billion tons 
by 2025. This estimate, it should be 
stressed, does not include the hidden 
needs of the poor who will be priced 
out of the market. In a well-fed world, 
another 400 million tons of cereals 
would likely be required, bringing the 
total cereal need in developing coun- 
tries to 2.4 billion tons by 2025. 
If recent yield growth rates for 
cereals continue to 2025, then total ce- 
real production in developing countries 
will increase to 1.7 billion. This will 
leave a shortfall of 0.7 billion tons, over 
half occurring in South Asia and Sub- 
Saharan Africa. By 2025 the food need 
in South Asia w-ill be 70 percent greater 
Particularly 
worrying is the 
evidence, as yet 
not well 
documented, of 
signs of stagnation 
in yield growth 
rates in those areas 
of developing 
countries where the 
green revolution 
had its greatest 
impact. 
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To meet their own 
market demand 
and that of 
developing 
countries, and to 
provide the 
necessary food aid, 
industrial countries 
would have to at 
least double food 
production by the 
year 2025, from 
860 million tons to 
2 billion tons. 
than food production, and in Sub-Sa- 
haran Africa two and a half times as 
much. If the environmental constraints 
turn out to be as severe as some pre- 
dict, and if the technologies are not 
available to deliver continuing yield 
grovvth rates, then these shortfalls could 
become even larger. 
TWO SCENARIOS 
If our analysis is correct, we can 
envisage two contrasting scenarios: 
Scenario L Some industrial coun- 
tries continue to produce food w-e11 in 
excess of their requirements and ex- 
port this excess to meet the demand of 
developing countries. If it is assumed 
that the environmental constraints to 
increased food production can be over- 
come, and if the food needs of the poor 
are ignored, then there is little cause 
for concern. The food demands of de- 
veloping countries, as expressed in na- 
tional and international markets, will 
be met by national production in the 
areas of proven potential and by trade 
or aid from industrial countries. On 
present estimates this would entail 
some 300 million tons of cereals being 
sold to developing countries by the in- 
dustrialized world in 2025, at today’s 
world prices. 
If the food needs of the poor are 
not ignored, then under this scenario, 
a further 400 million tons would be 
required in 2025 as subsidized or free 
food aid. This is equivalent to over 20 
times the current supply of direct food 
aid and would cost some US$44 billion 
(1988 prices). Such massive food aid 
would place heavy burdens on devel- 
oping countries, particularly on the in- 
frastructure for the receipt and distri- 
bution of the aid. It is also likely to 
depress local prices and add to exist- 
ing disincentives for local food produc- 
tion. 
To meet their own market de- 
mand and that of developing countries, 
and to provide the necessary food aid, 
industrial countries would have to at 
least double food production by the 
year 2025, from 860 million tons to 2 
billion tons. This would necessitate 
considerable increases in yields per 
hectare and the bringing back into pro- 
duction of currently uncultivated land. 
Inevitably the environmental costs of 
such a scenario would be high. 
A more fundamental objection to 
this scenario is that a significant por- 
tion of the population in the develop- 
ing w-orld w-ould fail to participate in 
global economic growth. 
Scenario 2 The developing 
countries greatly increase their own 
food production so as to largely meet 
their own needs, including the needs 
of the poor, investing in agricultural 
development as part of a larger devel- 
opment pr0cess.j An alternative sce- 
nario envisages a rapid and broad- 
based growth in the developing world, 
not only in food production, but in 
agricultural and natural resources pro- 
duction generally. This scenario explic- 
itly recognizes that food security is not 
simply a matter of producing enough 
food. It also depends on employment 
and incomes. Most of the w-orld’s hun- 
gry and food insecure are rural based. 
If they are not growing enough food 
to meet their needs, they must have 
the means to purchase the food they 
require, and hence are dependent on 
’ Agriculture and natural resources use are inex- 
tricably related. In the following, therefore, ag- 
ricultural development is throughout understood 
to mean the development of agriculture and 
natural resources, including forestry and fisher- 
ies; agricultural research means research in ag- 
riculture and natural resources. 
50 
rural employment and income created 
by agriculture and the development 
of natural resources. Agriculture, for- 
estry, and fisheries are powerful en- 
gines of development. Increased pro- 
duction and employment in these sec- 
tors can generate considerable em- 
ployment, income, and growth in the 
rest of the economy. 
Very few countries have experi- 
enced rapid economic growth with- 
out preceeding or accompanying 
growth in agriculture. Those countries 
who have achieved the most rapid ag- 
ricultural growth in the past 20 years 
also have had rapid economic growth. 
Countries with real declines in agri- 
culture have had the lowest growth 
rates in the economy. 
The development of agriculture 
is, moreover, central to the challenge 
posed by population growth. Experi- 
ence indicates that decline in birth 
rates is crucially dependent on food 
and income security, coupled with 
education and enhanced earning op- 
portunities for women. Such oppor- 
tunities can be provided by the pro- 
duction, processing, and trading ac- 
tivities generated by broad-based ag- 
ricultural and natural resources devel- 
opment. 
Environmental protection and 
conservation is also crucially depen- 
dent on appropriate agricultural and 
natural resources development. Sus- 
tainable approaches to food produc- 
tion and to forestry and fisheries man- 
agement can reverse land degradation 
and pollution from agrochemicals, re- 
move pressure on national parks and 
reserves, conserve biodiversity, and, at 
the same time, increase food security. 
In summary a major investment 
in agriculture and natural resources 
in developing countries could: 
create employment and incomes 
for the mass of the poor; 
deliver food security; 
help to reduce birth rates through 
increased food and income secu- 
rity; 
protect and conserve the environ- 
ment; 
stimulate development in the rest 
of the economy; and 
ensure prosperity in the industri- 
alized world through the stimula- 
tion of global trade and an in- 
creased likelihood of political sta- 
bility. 
THE WAY AHEAD 
What is Needed for Agricultural 
Development? 
There is no single recipe for suc- 
cessful agricultural development, 
though there is a broad consensus on 
many of the essential ingredients. These 
include: an enabling policy environ- 
ment that does not discriminate against 
agriculture, forestry, or fisheries; liber- 
alized markets for farm inputs and out- 
puts, with major private sector involve- 
ment; efficient rural financial institu- 
tions; adequate rural infrastructure; and 
effective institutions to develop and 
disseminate appropriate agricultural 
technologies. 
Making sure that agricultural 
growth contributes to poverty allevia- 
tion, equity, and food security requires: 
. the creation of employment for the 
land poor and landless; 
. increased production on small, 
medium-sized, and large farms; 
and 
* attention to regions of varying 
agroclimatic potential, not just the 
best. 
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Agriculture, 
forestry, and 
fisheries are 
powerful engines of 
development. 
Increased 
production and 
employment in 
these sectors can 
generate 
considerable 
employment, 
income, and growth 
in the rest of the 
economy 
The scope of 
bringing further 
land and water 
resources into 
production is now 
limited, and future 
growth will depend 
more and more on 
increasing the 
productivity of 
already utilized 
resources. 
Instruments for achieving these 
goals include appropriate targeting of 
agricultural research and extension; 
ensuring adequate access by all types 
of farmers to credit, inputs, and mar- 
keting services; investments in rural 
education, clean water, health, family 
planning, and nutrition programs to 
improve human resources; attention to 
women’s needs and legal rights: and, 
in some cases, land reform or redistri- 
bution. 
The relative importance of these 
requirements is complex and country 
specific, but recent experience is clear 
on two counts. First, while economic 
liberalization within developing coun- 
tries and reform of international trad- 
ing policies are necessary prerequisites 
for significant agricultural growth, they 
are not sufficient. Accelerated growth 
in agricultural output cannot be main- 
tained without adequate investments in 
rural infrastructure and in agricultural 
research and extension. Indeed with- 
out such investment the results of lib- 
eralization policies may well fall short 
of expectations and set governments 
against market-oriented approaches. 
Second, investments in agricul- 
tural research to generate new tech- 
nologies and knowledge continue to 
give consistently high rates of return. 
This has been demonstrated time and 
time again in ex post cost/benefit analy- 
ses of individual research projects and 
programs. It also emerges from time- 
series analyses of the sources of growth 
in factor productivity in agriculture for 
individual countries. 
What Are the Research Priorities? 
High economic returns to agricul- 
tural research occurred during an era 
when new land and water resources 
were still being brought into produc- 
tion in many developing countries. The 
scope for bringing further land and wa- 
ter resources into production is now 
limited, and future growth will depend 
more and more on increasing the pro- 
ductivity of already utilized resources. 
Moreover, the benefits from agricultural 
research have still to reach large num- 
bers of poor and hungry in the world. 
LMany of the past successes in re- 
search were due to concentration on 
high-potential areas (usually irrigated) 
and generic technologies that had wide- 
spread application (e.g. the high yield- 
ing varieties of rice and wheat). Such 
research must continue if the food de- 
mands of the escalating urban popula- 
tions are to be met. Yet, in the future, 
achieving higher yields alone will not 
be enough; they have to be produced 
more cheaply and in a more sustain- 
able manner. 
In summary, future research on 
high-potential areas should be aimed 
at: 
. higher yields per hectare; 
. at less cost; 
. with less environmental damage; 
and 
. coupled with research on pricing: 
marketing, and distribution poli- 
cies that ensure that the poor gain. 
Research should also address the 
needs of the many rural poor who are 
landless or poor laborers living in the 
well-endowed, high agricultural pro- 
duction lands, providing it produces 
technologies that generate greater em- 
ployment. The majority of the rural 
poor live in areas that are resource 
poor, highly heterogeneous, and risk 
prone. Agriculture here is limited by 
lower rainfall and less potential for ir- 
rigation, or steep slopes or poor soil 
structure, or lack of macro- or micro- 
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nutrients, or the presence of salts and 
other toxic compounds, or some com- 
bination of these. The yield response 
to research may be lower and the 
costs may be higher because of greater 
site specificity of the results, yet the 
benefits to the rural poor can be con- 
siderable. 
This second type of research will 
be more complex, aimed at improv- 
ing farming systems rather than spe- 
cific commodities, with less reliance 
on the exploitation of resources origi- 
nating outside the farm-fertilizers 
and pesticides. Such resources are 
often costly and sometimes unreliable, 
and frequently contribute to environ- 
mental degradation. They will con- 
tinue to be essential if even higher 
productivity is to be attained. Equally, 
more attention will need to be paid 
to better use of resources internal to 
the farm. These are the under-recog- 
nized natural resources of agriculture, 
forestry, and fisheries: 
. the natural parasites and preda- 
tors of pests; 
. algae, bacteria, and green ma- 
nures that supply nitrogen; 
. agroforestry and cropping sys- 
tems that reduce erosion; 
. underexploited wild tree and fish 
species; and 
. genetic systems that increase tol- 
erance to salts and toxins. 
Inherently these are inexpensive 
resources, yet with skill and ingenu- 
ity they can be used to generate higher 
productivity on a sustainable basis. 
Such research will also require 
greater involvement of farmers and 
local communities in research design. 
Because of the complexity of the 
problems and the site specificity of 
results, the initial focus should be on 
developing methods and approaches, 
and in demonstrating successes at case 
study sites. 
In summary, future research on 
areas with relatively lower potential 
should be aimed at: 
. higher yields per hectare; 
. at very low cost; 
. making maximal use of indig- 
enous resources-physical, bio- 
logical, and human; 
. on a sustainable basis; and 
. coupled with research on improv- 
ing the livelihoods of rural poor 
households through agriculture 
and agriculturally related income 
and employment generating activi- 
ties. 
Using Natural Enemies to Kill 
Pests 
Research showed that the damag- 
ing outbreaks of the brownplanthopper 
on rice often were due to the pesticides 
which killed off the spiders and other 
natural enemies of the planthoppers. 
Farmers were trained to recognize and 
regularly monitor the pests and their 
natural enemies. X&y then used rules 
to determine the minimum necessary 
use of pesticides, reducing the average 
number of sprayings per season from 
over four to one, while simultaneously 
increasing yields from 6.1 tons to 7.4 
tonsper hectare. 
A “Doubly Green” or “Super 
Green” Revolution 
The agricultural research chal- 
lenge for the future is complex and 
demanding. Research must continue to 
assist the intensification of high-poten- 
tial areas, albeit on a more environmen- 
tally-friendly basis. At the same time, 
53 
The majority of 
rural poor live 
areas that are 
resource poor, 
highly 
heterogeneous, 
and risk prone. 
the 
in 
The agricultural 
research challenge 
for the future is 
complex and 
demanding. 
Research must 
continue to assist 
the intensification 
of high-potential 
areas, albeit on a 
more 
environmentally- 
friendly basis. At 
the same time, 
more research will 
be needed in lower- 
potential areas, 
where rural poverty 
and associated 
resource 
degradation is and 
will increasingly be 
concentrated. 
more research will be needed in lower- 
potential areas, where rural poverty and 
associated resource degradation is and 
will increasingly be concentrated. The 
amount of additional agricultural out- 
put required will be large, more than 
doubling in South Asia and Africa by 
2025. 
In effect we require a revolution 
that is even more productive than the 
first green revolution and even more 
“green” in terms of conserving natural 
resources and the environment, a “dou- 
bly green” or “super green’! revolution. 
Over the next three decades it 
must aim to: 
. repeat the successes of the green 
revolution; 
. on a global scale; 
. in many diverse localities; and 
. be suitable, sustainable, and en- 
vironmentally-friendly. 
While the first green revolution 
took as its starting point the biological 
challenge inherent in producing new 
high-yielding food crops and then 
looked to determine how the benefits 
could reach the poor, this new revolu- 
tion has to reverse the chain of logic, 
starting with the socioeconomic de- 
mands of poor households and then 
seeking to identify appropriate research 
priorities. 
In essence the new priorities 
should be: food security; income and 
employment generation; and conserva- 
tion of natural resources and the envi- 
ronment, whose outcome is the creation 
of sustainable livelihoods for the poor. 
We Need to Exploit New Research 
Paradigms 
The successful breeding programs 
of the first green revolution relied on 
close collaboration between plant 
breeders, geneticists, agronomists, 
plant pathologists, and entomologists. 
In the future, such multi-disciplinary 
project teams will need even greater 
integration and a wider span of disci- 
plines, encompassing both the natural 
and social sciences. 
Present day biological and agri- 
cultural research institutions are in a 
state of change. They have different 
profiles of operation than they had a 
decade ago. Two developments in sci- 
ence are driving these changes: 
The first is the emergence of mo- 
lecular biology, a discipline, with its 
associated technologies, which is now 
integrated into all biological research 
fields. Molecular biology is concerned 
with the sub-cellular basis of life. It has 
been transformed by the recent revo- 
lutionary advances in laboratory 
technologies which have greatly in- 
creased not only our understanding of 
sub-cellular and genetic processes, but 
also have created opportunities for their 
manipulation. 
The immediate potential of mo- 
lecular biology lies in the design and 
engineering of new plant and animal 
types required for both high- and low- 
input systems. Plant breeders have 
been able to overcome some major 
limitations to yield by selecting needed 
characteristics from germplasm re- 
sources. Good examples are genes 
providing resistance to insect pests 
(brown plant hopper in rice) and dis- 
ease (rust in wheat), tolerance to envi- 
ronmental stresses (aluminum toler- 
ance in wheat), changes in plant ar- 
chitecture (semi-dwarf wheats), and 
alternatives in plant development (pho- 
toperiod control of flowering time in 
soybean). 
There are major problems for 
which plant breeders have not been 
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able to identify or introduce appro- 
priate new genetic variation. The 
problems potentially amenable to so- 
lutions through genetic engineering 
include: resistance to viruses, insects, 
and herbicides; tolerance to salt, 
drought, and heat; crop reserve im- 
provement (carbohydrates, proteins, 
and oils); and nitrogen fixation. DNA 
technologies are beginning to make 
an impact in some of these cases. The 
key developments have been the de- 
velopment of gene transfer technolo- 
gies for most of the major crop and 
pasture species. Molecular biologists 
can now design and build gene con- 
structs which can be inserted into the 
genetic tape of a target plant to pro- 
vide the transgenic plant with a new 
trait (e.g. pest resistance). As a result, 
the plant breeder is no longer re- 
stricted to the genetic variation that 
arises in traditional breeding pro- 
grams. 
Such genetic engineering has 
special value for agricultural produc- 
tion in developing countries. It has 
the potential to provide built-in solu- 
tions to biotic and abiotic challenges, 
reducing the need for chemical inputs 
such as fungicides and pesticides. The 
seed, with its enhanced genetic in- 
structions, is a “farmer-friendly soft- 
ware package,” compatible with low- 
input agriculture and fitting the re- 
quirements of sustainability now 
placed on higher-input agricultural 
systems. 
The second development is an 
ecological approach that, in tandem 
with economics, sociology, and an- 
thropology, is rapidly increasing our 
understanding of the structure and dy- 
namics of agroecosystems6 Ecology 
is concerned with the interactions 
among organisms and between organ- 
isms and their environments. In re- 
cent years it has been transformed by 
sophisticated field experimentation 
based on quantitative and qualitative 
system models. 
Recent advances in population, 
community, and ecosystem research 
are providing a better understanding 
of the complex dynamics that arise 
within crop populations and in mul- 
tiple-cropping and agroforestry sys- 
tems. Practical applications include the 
development of integrated pest man- 
agement systems, where the use of 
natural parasites and predators can be 
substituted for pesticide applications, 
often involving savings in costs and 
reductions in environmental damage. 
Ecological thinking has also be- 
gun to inform understanding of the 
livelihoods of poor households, par- 
ticularly in their patterns of response 
to environmental stresses and shocks. 
Such knowledge contributes to bet- 
ter practical appreciation of the ways 
small farmers and poor households 
can utilize specific agricultural tech- 
nologies to enhance their livelihoods 
and render them more sustainable. 
Perhaps the most important out- 
come of this partnership between 
ecology and the social sciences has 
been the development of new meth- 
ods and, more importantly, new ap- 
proaches and attitudes to the involve- 
ment of farmers themselves in the 
analysis of their farming systems and 
livelihoods. Simple, yet powerful, 
methods have been developed that 
encourage farmer analysis, design, 
6 In this document we define an 
agroecosystem as “an ecological and socio- 
economic system, comprising domesticated 
plants and/or animals and the people who 
husband them, intended for the purpose of 
producing food, fiber, or other agricultural 
products.” 
The immediate 
potential of 
molecular biology 
lies in the design 
and engineering of 
new plant and 
animal types 
required for both 
high- and low-input 
sys terns. 
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Perhaps the most 
important outcome 
of this partnership 
between ecology 
and the social 
sciences has been 
the development of 
new methods and, 
more importan t/x 
new approaches 
and attitudes to the 
in voivemen t of 
farmers themselves 
in the analysis of 
their farming 
systems and 
livelihoods. 
and management of agricultural and 
natural resources systems in partner- 
ship with research scientists and ex- 
tension specialists. These are now 
showing practical results in their ap- 
plication to varietal selection, the de- 
velopment of integrated pest manage- 
ment systems, the construction and 
management of small-scale irrigation, 
reforestation, and the conservation of 
watersheds. 
These developments in molecu- 
lar biology and ecology, at the core of 
the new interdisciplinarity of biologi- 
cal research, are having considerable 
impact on laboratory and field research. 
More importantly, they provide novel 
ways of thinking and inquiring about 
biological, agricultural and socioeco- 
nomic phenomena, bringing new sys- 
tem perspectives, and enhancing our 
capacity to define critical answerable 
questions. They are not alternatives. In- 
deed they are complementary, provid- 
ing the means whereby farmers and 
field and laboratory scientists can col- 
laborate in identifying and answering 
the research questions posed by the 
socio-economic needs of poor house- 
holds. 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 
RESEARCH 
Why Do We Need Public 
Research? 
In industrial countries the produc- 
tion of new varieties and agronomic 
technologies has increasingly been as- 
signed to the private sector. Better-off 
farmers, often heavily subsidized, are 
able to afford the products of expen- 
sive research. Private companies can 
patent and protect their discoveries for 
Farmer Participation in 
Agricultural Research and 
Development 
CIAT has established “‘innovators’ 
workshops” in which farmers design 
and evaluate experiments. One experi- 
ment tackled the problem of lack of 
stakes for climbing snap beans. The 
farmers suggested growing the beans 
after tomatoes, thereby exploiting the to- 
mato stakes and the residual fertilizer. 
Using various criteria of success that 
they devised, thefarmers agreed on two 
snap bean varieties as outstanding for 
this system. 
Collaborative research between 
II&V and the Nepal Department of Irri- 
gation has developed better methodsfor 
identifying hill irrzgation systems with 
unrealizedpotential andparticipato y 
mechanisms in which farmers plan, 
design, and mobilize resources for the 
improvement of even quite large sys- 
tems. The results are greater efficiency 
and sustainability of operation. 
sufficient time to realize an acceptable 
profit. 
Inevitably private research focuses 
on the major high-value crops, on la- 
bor-saving technologies, and on the 
needs of capital-intensive farming. By 
contrast research to feed the poor is less 
attractive to private interests, because: 
. It frequently involves long lead 
times, for example in developing 
new plant types of minor staples. 
. It is risky, particularly when fo- 
cused on heterogeneous environ- 
ments that are subject to high cli- 
matic and other variability. 
. The beneficiaries have little capac- 
ity to pay for the research. 
. The products cannot be restricted 
to those who pay, if they can. 
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. Intellectual property rights can 
rarely be protected. 
Thus, while private research car- 
ried out by national and multinational 
companies has much to contribute to 
well-endowed lands and the better-off 
farmers, most of the needs of the poor 
will have to be met by public research 
agencies. 
Public research also has a crucial 
role to play in ensuring that technolo- 
gies are sustainable. Inevitably the ben- 
eficiaries of environmentally appropri- 
ate technologies are often not the us- 
ers, or at least the users alone. In con- 
trast to private research, where the 
benefits are captured by private com- 
panies and a iimited group of users, 
public research aimed at low cost, 
sustainable food production has ben- 
efits that spread to farmers, large and 
small, to other rural dwellers and, 
most importantly, to poor consum- 
ers. Public agricultural research aims 
to exploit the potential for positive 
externalities, especially as they ben- 
efit the poor. 
Why Do We Need a Continuing 
Effort in International Research? 
The major problems of food se- 
curity, poverty alleviation, and conser- 
vation of the environment that we have 
described above are not restricted to 
one country or region of the world. 
They affect, and will continue to af- 
fect, a major proportion of the world’s 
population in many regions of Africa, 
Asia, and South America. 
As yet, many of the countries 
worst affected still lack sufficient agri- 
cultural and natural resources research 
capacities to deal with their problems. 
The required research typically draws 
on many disciplines and production 
specialties, often lacking even in well- 
developed NARS. ,4n international re- 
search effort, involving partnerships 
between national and international cen- 
ters, can help to remedy these deficien- 
cies and provide outputs which have 
impacts that cross national boundaries. 
Often the problems are common and 
so are the solutions. 
Thus, research activities that have 
significant economics of scale or scope 
are strong candidates for international 
agricultural research. In these cases, it 
is more cost-effective for individual 
countries to pool their resources and 
to conduct research on an international 
basis. This is especially true for small 
countries. 
Second, research activities that 
involve important international exter- 
nalities (such as spillover benefits or 
environmental costs and benefits) also 
have strong justification for interna- 
tional research. Since the costs and 
benefits of international externalities are 
not fully borne by the country that 
undertakes the research, there will be 
incentives to under- or over-invest in 
research when judged from the per- 
spective of global welfare. For example, 
individual countries are unlikely to in- 
vest enough in research activities that 
have spillover benefits for other coun- 
tries (e.g. germplasm that can be used 
in other countries), or that lead to re- 
duced carbon emissions (e.g. sustain- 
able forestry), which protect 
biodiversity, or prevent soil erosion into 
international waterways, because they 
do not capture all the benefits from the 
research. 
Similarly, countries are likely to 
over-invest in research activities that 
indirectly promote deforestation or 
water pollution, if the environmental 
costs are borne by other countries. In- 
ternational agricultural research can 
While private 
research carried 
out by national and 
multinational 
companies has 
much to contribute 
to well-endowed 
lands and the 
better-off farmers, 
most of the needs 
of the poor will 
have to be met by 
public research 
agencies. 
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In terna tional 
agricultural 
research can help 
correct for under- 
investment in 
globally appropriate 
research activities 
and for national 
over-investment in 
research activities 
that have negative 
environmental 
effects. 
help correct for under-investment in 
globally appropriate research activities 
and for national over-investment in 
research activities that have negative 
environmental effects. 
Third, international research can 
help strengthen IYARS in the early 
stages of development and, in general, 
help improve the access of NARS to 
new knowledge and technology. This 
will ensure that NARS at all levels of 
development can benefit from the most 
recent advances in science and tech- 
nology. 
The NARS of developing countries 
encompass a wide range of institutions, 
varying in size and capability. From 
1970 to 1990 many new public agri- 
cultural research institutes and uni- 
versities were created. In the late 
1980s public deficits gradually led 
governments to reduce research in- 
vestment and operating expenses; as 
a consequence, many NARS have 
suffered major crises, the most severe 
in Africa. 
One advocated solution was 
privatization. In practice this has proved 
difficult to achieve. There has also been 
slow progress in setting up farmer sup- 
ported research organizations. Producer 
cooperatives, in various guises, have 
proved successful at the organization of 
inputs and marketing, but few have ex- 
tended their remit to research. Success 
has been more apparent in the research 
programs funded and supported by na- 
tional and international NGOs. 
Despite the financial stringencies 
they face, industrial countries have 
continued to provide support to NARS 
through collaborative links involving 
their own universities and research 
centers. A few European countries have 
maintained public organizations for 
international agricultural research and 
58 
have recently set up the European Con- 
sortium for Agricultural Research in the 
Tropics (ECART). The United States has 
comparable programs, often involving 
the Land Grant universities, and funded 
by the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID)? Ford, Rocke- 
feller, and other private foundations. 
Japan, Canada, and Australia have also 
set up institutions specializing in sci- 
entific cooperation. These efforts, how- 
ever. are not well coordinated. Infor- 
mation circulates poorly, and there is 
little interaction between the different 
protagonists. 
What is the Role of the CGIAR 
System in the International 
Effort? 
Investments in the CGIAR consti- 
tute only 3 percent of annual public 
spending on agricultural research glo- 
bally. Despite this small share, the 
CGIAR plays a key role in fostering the 
effectiveness and further development 
of the global agricultural research sys- 
tem. 
For over 20 years the CGIAR has 
played a leadership role which stems 
from its scientific credibility and widely 
acknowledged achievements. The 
CGIAR is the only truly international, 
non-political agricultural research en- 
tity. The CGIAR has also served as a 
bridge between institutions, most no- 
tably between developing country re- 
search systems and advanced institu- 
tions in industrial and developing coun- 
tries. Their know-ledge of the condi- 
tions of NARS in various levels of de- 
velopment has enabled CGIAR centers 
to demonstrate best practices through 
networks, consortia, and other means, 
leading to greater South-South coop- 
eration in research. 
The CGIAR is an informal consor- 
tium of donors, encompassing national 
governments and international agen- 
cies, linked by the common purpose 
of eradicating hunger and poverty 
through research. To achieve this task 
it has created a family of 16 research 
centers. While each center has its own 
board and largely sets its own agenda, 
these conform to priorities and objec- 
tives determined by an independent TAC. 
The essence of the CGIAR is in- 
dependence, accountability, and re- 
search excellence, monitored and 
evaluated by external mechanisms. This 
provides a quality guarantee for donors 
who can make funding decisions within 
an analytical framework provided by a 
body that is independent of the ulti- 
mate recipients of support. Few insti- 
tutions receiving aid funding can match 
this feature. These characteristics have 
contributed to a remarkable record of 
research achievement over the past 30 
years, especially in germplasm charac- 
terization, plant breeding, pathology, 
pest control, crop, livestock, and 
agroforestry systems, and field appli- 
cation of new technologies of tillage 
and soil conservation, 
In summary, the scientific and 
technological infrastructure of the 
CGIAR provides a unique capacity for 
focused research with worldwide ap- 
plication. From the donor and devel- 
oping country perspectives the CGIAR 
provides public research of guaranteed 
high value, at relatively low cost. 
A FUTURE FOR THE CGIAR 
of rapid population growth are daunt- 
ing in their complexity. They cannot 
be solved by the simple transfer of tech- 
nologies, but require genuine partner- 
ships operating at both global and re- 
gional levels. The research institutes of 
industrial countries, both public and 
private, and the national agricultural 
research institutes of developing coun- 
tries need to be linked in new ways 
that reflect the opportunities created by 
the revolution in modern biology. 
In the future, although the 
CGIAR’s overall purpose will remain 
the same,’ its modalities of operation 
will need to change considerably if it 
is to meet these new- challenges. Some 
of its key roles will require long term 
support and may well operate on a 
center base, but the CGIAR w-ill need 
to increasingly focus on new and dif- 
ferent partnerships that work toward 
well defined outcomes. 
This will require changes in the 
strategic and operational planning and 
funding of the CGIAR System. A port- 
folio of programs, rather than reliance 
only on a set of centers, should consti- 
tute the business prospectus of the Sys- 
tem and ultimately be the basis for fund 
allocation. 
The justification for this program 
based approach is: 
. The complexity of the challenge 
(realizing high, sustainable pro- 
ductivity at a cost that provides 
affordable food for the poor). 
. The need to foster research part- 
nerships that go beyond a simple 
transfer of technology. 
Their knowledge of 
the conditions of 
NARS in various 
levels of 
development has 
enabled CGIA R 
centers to 
demonstrate best 
practices through 
networks, 
consortia, and other 
means, leading to 
greater South- 
South cooperation 
in research. 
The Need for Change to a 
Program Based Approach 
The problems of providing sus- 
tainable food security for all in a world 
’ Through international agricultural research 
and related activities, and in partnership with 
national research systems, to contribute to 
sustainable improvements in the productiv- 
ity of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries in 
developing countries in ways that enhance 
nutrition and well-being, especially of low- 
income people. 
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Participants in Potential 
Partnerships in International 
Agricultural Research 
Industrial Countries 
Reseaxb institutes 
Universities 
Private cofnpanies 
Consortia 
CGIAR 
International agricultuml resend7 
centers 
Developing Countries 
Regional Tesearch institutes 
National research institutes 
CTnive7sities 
Private companies 
iVGOs 
Farmers 
. The opportunity to exploit the 
new paradigms (molecular biol- 
ogy and ecology), requiring inter- 
disciplinary partnerships and links 
to advanced expertise. 
. The increasing focus on a wide 
range of agroecosystems necessi- 
tating greater in-country expertise 
and farmer participation in re- 
search. 
. The need to work to agendas of 
widely agreed research outcomes 
and outputs. 
To operate in this context, the 
CGIAR will need broader-based advice 
on such issues as demography, natural 
resources, and food security, and be 
able to keep abreast of the develop- 
ments and changing capabilities of 
modern biological science. So 
equipped, it can then formulate its 
agenda of collaborative programs 
within an overall agreed international 
agricultural research effort. One con- 
sequence will be that programs will 
commonly have funds from a number 
of different sources, within and out- 
side of the CGIAR; and will be limited 
in their duration. 
The Underlying Principles for the 
Future 
Three principles should apply in 
defining the CGIAR’s specific respon- 
sibilities and roles within the interna- 
tional research effort: 
. Subsidiarity. As a general prin- 
ciple, the primary responsibility 
for a research activity should be 
devolved to the lowest level in the 
hierarchy, from global to regional 
to national, that can carry out the 
activity most appropriately and 
efficiently. 
. Partnership. In carrying out a re- 
search activity, partnerships with 
agencies with complementary 
skills and experience should al- 
ways be considered as an alter-- 
native to adding capacities to 
CGIAR centers. 
. Transfer. Even if there is no clear 
gain in efficiency or expertise from 
the involvement of developing 
country research institutions, the 
objective of strengthening devel- 
oping country NARS justifies plac- 
ing priority on their involvement 
with international research efforts. 
The Nature of the Programs 
Applying the principles. we can 
envisage the CGIAR as contributing to 
international research activities through 
two types of programs: 
. Global programs 
. Regional action programs 
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Global programs would be 
geared toward strategic research prob- 
lems of international significance. Re- 
gional action programs would ad- 
dress specific sustainable production 
problems faced in significant geo- 
graphic regions. It is important to dif- 
ferentiate these two types of programs 
because of differences in the scope of 
the problems to be addressed and the 
range of actors likely to be involved, 
both in funding and in executing the 
research effort. 
The CGIAR would progressively 
channel a11 of its funding into a set of 
well-defined research programs. This is 
a departure from the present practice of 
funding international centers. In the fu- 
ture, institutes should be receiving fund- 
ing from the CGLAR, but only for their 
involvement in one or more specific pro- 
grams of interest to the CGIAR. 
We suggest three types of global 
programs: 
. long-term, center-based programs; 
. multi-center programs; and 
. collaborative strategic research 
programs. 
Long-term, Center-based 
Programs 
The CGIAR would provide fund- 
ing to these programs on a continuous 
and stable basis. The centers would be 
fewer in number than at present. As a 
group, they would focus on the heart- 
land of the CGIAR mandate and carry 
out programs which have a long-term 
perspective. The CGIAR would approve 
programs, and the allocation of re- 
sources to centers for carrying out these 
programs would be as at present. Ex- 
isting CGIAR mechanisms would be 
used in the monitoring and evaluation 
of their implementation. 
These center-based programs 
should be tailored toward resolving 
problems: 
. in regions where increased pro- 
duction is needed most urgently 
(such as in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
South Asia); and 
. in situations where public re- 
search is most required because 
of market failures, and where 
sustainability concerns are most 
pressing. 
Such programs would focus pri- 
marily on the development of genetic 
materials for selected crop, livestock, 
forestry, and fish species that are rec- 
ognized as providing keys to the solu- 
tions of these problems. In their fund- 
ing and execution, long-term programs 
would be designed to preserve and 
enhance the intellectual capital and the 
intellectual heartland of the CGUR cen- 
ters. 
Multi-center Programs 
Some of the programs supported 
by the CGIAR would be carried out by 
all or a subset of the centers. These 
programs would be continuous or long- 
term in duration. They would be man- 
aged through an inter-center mecha- 
nism and would require funding from 
the CGIAR, except for services which 
should be financed by their users. 
Illustrative examples of multi-cen- 
ter programs include: 
. the conservation, characterization, 
and evaluation of selected 
germplasm; 
. the provision of information, ma- 
terials, and training in research 
methods and approaches; and 
. advice on institutional strengthen- 
ing and on food production, dis- 
The CGIAR would 
progressively 
channel all of its 
funding into a set of 
well-defined 
research programs. 
This is a departure 
from the present 
practice of funding 
in terna tional 
ten ters. 
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In their funding and 
execution, long- 
term programs 
would be designed 
to preserve and 
enhance the 
intellectual capital 
and the intellectual 
heartland of the 
CGIA R ten ters. 
tribution, and pricing policies for 
sustainable food security. 
Collaborative Strategic Research 
Programs 
These would focus on research 
problems which are global in nature 
and which cut across the core themes 
covered by the centers. The programs 
would be of a finite duration, usually a 
5 to 10 year period. The problems cov- 
ered would represent a “good invest- 
ment risk” for the CGIAR and other 
partners funding them. The research 
would be carried out by a set of col- 
laborating institutes. including CGIAR 
centers. One of these would assume 
leadership of the effort. Funding for the 
programs would come from the CGIAR 
as well as other sources. The effort 
would be evaluated by existing CGIAR 
mechanisms. 
Illustrative examples of research 
themes that fall in this category include: 
. decline in yields of major cereals 
in intensively cropped, cereal- 
based systems; 
. development of small-scale irriga- 
tion and water conservation sys- 
tems; 
. improved understanding of key 
biological, physical, social, and 
economic dynamics of selected 
critical ecosystems, such as coastal 
zones; 
. reduced productivity of global 
pollutants~ especially nitrous ox- 
ide and methane, from agricultural 
practices; and 
. development and understanding 
of user participatory approaches 
in the design and management of 
irrigation! forestry, and fisheries 
systems. 
Regional Action Programs 
These would be problem-specific 
research programs, of a shorter dura- 
tion than global strategic research pro- 
grams. Agendas would be set by NARS, 
regional organizations, and interested 
donors, in partnership. Funding would 
come mainly from sources other than 
the CGIAR, although the CGIAR could 
also contribute to funding. Leadership 
of the programs would normally be 
assumed by NARS or other agencies, 
but in some cases the CGIAR centers 
could be asked to play a leading role. 
Monitoring and evaluation of the cf- 
fort would be by a special mechanism 
agreed upon by participants. The 
CGIAR could use its own internal 
mechanism to monitor/evaluate aspects 
of the program involving CGIAR fund- 
ing. 
The following illustrate outputs of 
possible regional action programs: 
. better yielding crop varieties and 
agroeconomic systems appropri- 
ate to specific acid and mineral 
deficient soils in the savannas of 
Latin America; 
. synergetic cropping and crop-live- 
stock systems providing higher: 
more stable yields in the highlands 
of West Asia; 
. more productive cereal-based 
farming systems in Eastern and 
Southern Africa; 
. sustainable coffee and cocoa 
based farming systems in West 
Africa; and 
. integrated aquaculture systems for 
coastal South and Southeast Asia. 
In summary, we envisage a CGIAR 
which is a more open and collabora- 
tive system than at present; a CGIAR 
which leads the global international ag- 
ricultural research effort by: 
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* analyzing problems; 
e developing agendas; 
. fostering partnerships; and 
. providing independent advice and 
evaluation to achieve solutions to 
the problems. 
The CGIAR of tomorrow should 
use a wider range of institutional mo- 
dalities in fulfilling its mandate than at 
present. [See Figure 4, page 68.1 
CONCLUSIONS 
Over the next 30 years the chal- 
lenge we face is to: 
. meet the food needs of the more 
than 700 million who go hungry 
today; 
. provide food at affordable prices 
for almost 100 million more 
people every year (the largest 
annual population increase in his- 
tory); 
. increase production through 
greater productivity per unit of 
land (expansion in area is no 
longer feasible in most of the 
world); and 
. do this in such a way as to con- 
serve and not degrade natural re- 
sources and the environment, 
These are challenges for the world 
community as a whole, not just the 
countries where the poor live. It is not 
simply a matter of justice and equity. 
The world is more interdependent than 
ever before. The growing globalization 
of institutions, ideas, capital, technol- 
ogy, and trade, and the opportunities 
created by the advances in information 
technology, are creating a world in 
which events in one country or region 
affect us all. Unless addressed smartly 
and in advance, poverty and hunger 
could lead to political destabilization 
and environmental destruction, with 
worldwide implications. 
We have a collective responsihil- 
ity to eradicate hunger from the face 
of the Earth in ways that protect our 
common environment. It is not simply 
a matter of meeting the market demand 
for food. The new mandate is to as- 
sure food security for all the world’s 
population through agricultural re- 
search that not only adds to food pro- 
duction but generates employment and 
income that, in turn, increases the mar- 
ket demand for food. 
The panel believes we should turn 
to science for help-help in creating a 
new agricultural revolution: one that is 
global, equitable, sustainable, and en- 
vironmentally-friendly. Science can 
meet this challenge, because new para- 
digms in science, particularly in mo- 
lecular biology and ecology. are pro- 
viding a better understanding of the 
complex interactions between physi- 
cal, biological, and social systems, and 
are helping to create the tools and tech- 
nologies needed to address the prob- 
lems we face. 
Mobilizing science in this way 
means significant investments in pub- 
lic research, both national and interna- 
tional. Because many of the problems 
that need to be researched are com- 
mon across countries and regions, an 
international research effort is likely to 
be more efficient and productive. We 
advocate the creation of a global agri- 
cultural research system that links a 
range of institutions with one another 
in new partnership modes. 
As the only truly global, apolitical 
public international agricultural re- 
search system today, the CGIAR has a 
special role to play in the evolution of 
such a system. It should lead in the 
identification of research problems of 
international significance, in the design 
of research programs, and in the as- 
We have a 
collective 
responsibility to 
eradicate hunger 
from the face of the 
Earth in ways that 
protect our 
common 
environment. 
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If these 
recommendations 
are adopted, we 
believe that, with 
adequate support 
from the donor 
community, the 
CGIAR can 
spearhead a new 
global movement to 
ensure sustainable 
agriculture for a 
food secure world. 
sessment of the impact of the overall 
global effort. 
To do these things the CGIAR will 
need some adjustments, both in the 
problems it directly addresses and in 
the modalities it uses to implement re- 
search programs. It should focus pri- 
marily on strategic research problems 
of global significance, through long- 
term, institute-based programs, multi- 
institute programs, and collaborative 
strategic research programs. 
At the same time, the CGIAR 
should also participate in regional ac- 
tion programs to a lesser or greater 
extent, depending on the strengths and 
needs of its developing country part- 
ners. Here the CGIAR would play a 
bridging and catalytic role, but the lead- 
ership should rest with national or re- 
gional institutions. The current empha- 
sis on funding core programs of an 
exclusive set of research centers should 
give way to funding programs, carried 
out in collaboration with developed 
and developing country institutions. 
If these recommendations are 
adopted, we believe that, with ad- 
equate support from the donor com- 
munity, the CGIAR can spearhead a 
new global movement to ensure sus- 
tainable agriculture for a food secure 
world. 
I 
I 
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Figure 1: Population by Regions, 1990 and 2025 
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Figure 2a: Crop Yields in Asia 1961 to 1991: Composite of Maize, Rice, and Wheat 
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Figure 2b: Crop Yields in Africa 1961 to 1991: Composite of Maize, Rice, and Wheat 
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Figure 3: World Grain Production per Person, 1950 to 1993 
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APPENDIX II 
TECHNICAL ANNEX ON 
PROJECTION LMETHODOLOGY 
Peter Hazell 
International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI) 
The projections of food produc- 
tion, demand, and imports for the year 
2000 given in this document were de- 
rived from a global trade model devel- 
oped by IFPRI, the International Food 
Policy and Trade Simulation Model 
(IFPTSIM). The model is fully docu- 
mented in Agcaoili, Oga, and 
RosegranLs IFPTSIM is a market equi- 
librium model of foodgrains and grain- 
fed li\Testock products that solves for 
prices, demand, production. and trade 
by major countries/regions and for the 
world. [See Table 1, page 74.1 Popula- 
tion growth, income growth! and yield 
growth are all exogenous. [See Table 
2, page 75.1 However, growth in cereal 
production is endogenous because the 
cropped area is responsive to price. The 
model includes major livestock activi- 
ties; hence: all cereal production, de- 
mand, and trade figures are aggregates 
of human food and livestock feed. 
Cereal demand is endogenous and 
is driven by prices, income growth, and 
changes in the livestock sector. By defi- 
nition, cereal demand for each region 
equals production plus imports less 
exports. At the global level, cereal de- 
mand equals production. There is no 
global cereal gap between market de- 
mand and supply because the endog- 
enous price clears the market. The 
’ Agcaoili. M.. K. Oga, and ti1.W. Rosegrant. 
1993. “Structure and Operation of the Inter- 
national Food Policy and Trade Simulation 
Model (IPTSIM).” Paper presented at the Set- 
ond Workshop of the Rice Supply and De- 
mand Project. IKKI, Manila. 
hungry are simply priced out of the 
market, as in the real world. 
Because this document is con- 
cerned about the prospects for a well- 
fed world. the model projections have 
been supplemented by side calcula- 
tions of the additional cereals that 
would be needed in 2025 to meet the 
“hidden” food needs of the poor. The 
hidden need is calculated as follows. 
For each region, the amount of cere- 
als required to supply 3,000 calories 
per person per day was calculated 
using the population projections for 
2025. This level of calorie availability 
is assumed to be an acceptable mini- 
mum for meeting human food needs 
bzhiie allowing for livestock feed, 
seed. storage losses, and processing 
waste. The total amount of cereals 
required in a region to meet this mini- 
mum need is then compared with the 
projected market demand from the 
IFPTSIM model, and the difference is 
taken to be the ,‘hidden” cereals need. 
For regions with a positive hidden 
need, the total cereals gap is taken as 
the difference between total food 
need and projected production. In all 
other cases, the projected cereals gap 
is taken as the difference between 
projected market demand and pro- 
duction, which equals projected im- 
ports in the IFPTSIM results. 
These calculations of hidden 
food needs hinge critically on the re- 
quired calorie level assumed. Our as- 
sumption of 3,000 calories per per- 
son per day for cereals supply is 
hardly generous for a well-fed world, 
but it still leads to food gaps of 214 
million tons for Sub-Saharan Africa 
and 255 million tons for South Asia 
in 2025. Table 3 [see page 761 shows 
how these gaps change under differ- 
ent assumptions about the minimum 
calorie need. The gaps escalate enor- 
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mously as the calorie requirement is able malnutrition and hunger. Even 
increased. In 1988, average calorie when hidden foods needs are calcu- 
availability from cereals in Sub-Saharan lated using 1,500 calories per person 
Africa and South Asia was only 1,290 per day, this still leads to food gaps 
and 1,638 calories per person per day, in 2025 of 34 million tons for Africa 
but this was associated with consider- and 46 million tons for South Asia. 
I I 
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Table 1: Country/Region and Commodity Coverage in the IFPRI Model 
Cla.&fication Country/Region 
Developed Countries USA 
EC12 
Japan 
Other Western Europe 
Canada 
Australia 
New Zealand 
Other Developed Countries 
Other Eastern Europe 
Former Soviet Union 
Developing 
Countries 
Latin America 
Africa 
Middle East 
Asian LDCs 
Mexico 
Brazil 
Argentina 
Other Latin America 
Nigeria 
Other Africa 
Egypt 
Other Near East 
India 
Pakistan 
Bangladesh 
Indonesia 
tiiland 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Singapore 
South Korea 
China 
Other Southeast Asia 
Other South Asia 
Other East Asia 
Other Other Developing Countries 
Rest of the V(Torld 
Commodities Crops Wheat! rice, maize, other coarse 
grains, soybean 
Animal Products Beef, pork, poultry, mutton and 
lamb, fluid milk, eggs 
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Table 3: Projected Gaps in 2025 for Different Assumptions about Hidden Needs 
Africa 
south Other 
Asia Asia WANA LAC 
All 
Developing 
Model Projections 
Production 144.7 355.9 801.4 148.6 237.2 lJ587.8 
Market Demand 173.6 401.6 882.5 262.3 273.6 ~793.6 
Commercial Imports 28.9 45.7 8 1.1 113.7 36.4 305.8 
Hidden Veed (additional demand 
above market demand) 
1.500 calories per day 
2,000 
2,500 
3,000 
4,000 
5.5 5.5 
65.3 5.8 71.1 
124.9 107.6 232.5 
184.7 2Oc),it 374.1 
304.1 413.1 105.1 13.3 49.3 884.1) 
Total Gap (imports plus hidden need) 
1. jO0 calories per day 34.4 45.7 81.1 113.7 36.4 311.3 
2,000 74.2 51.5 81.1 113.7 36.4 376.9 
2.500 153.8 153.3 81.1 113.7 36.4 538.3 
3,000 213.6 255.1 81.1 113.7 36.4 699.7 
4,000 333.0 458.8 186.2 127.0 85.7 1,190.7 
76 
